Part 1: Hostage Negotiation: Case Study: Iran Hostage Crises (Extracts from Rogers attempt to negotiate with Ayatollah Beheshti)

In the fall of 1979, the United States Embassy in Teheran was seized. Most of the diplomats and other members of the Ameri­can staff were held hostage for many months. In the spring of 1980, President Carter tried to rescue them by helicopter. The attempt failed.

"Shortly thereafter, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler phoned me and asked me to see what I could do about the hostages. Cutler made it clear that I had no authority to make a binding commitment of any kind. Cutler would be available twenty-four hours a day through the White House switchboard. He obviously recognized that a government official who tried to brainstorm with Iranians would likely be heard as disclosing what the U.S. government was willing to do. Whatever was said by an official could then be interpreted as a bargaining pro­posal, to which the Iranians could be expected to ask for more.

 As a freewheeling professor working through a small, non­profit, nongovernmental organization, I saw my purpose as try­ing to generate a package that I might recommend to both sides.Through a student in Iran, I got in touch by telephone with the Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the Islamic Republican Party, who spoke English fairly well. Beheshti had apparently learned something about me. His manner was surprisingly genial. The conversation was roughly as follows:

 

ROGER: “What are Iran’s interests? What do you want?”

BEHESHTI: “I’ll tell you what we don’t want. We don’t want the New York courts to have anything to do with our fi­nancial claims.”

    ROGER: “Who do you want to decide any financial dispute? The Iranian courts?” BEHESHTI, laughing: “No, not that. How about arbitration at the Hague?” ROGER: “Do you think Iran will accept arbitration?” 

   BEHESHTI: “Right now, I will commit Iran to accept arbitration at the Hague. Will you commit the United States to do so?”

    ROGER: “As I told you, I have no authority of any kind to commit the United States. If we can            work something out, I am prepared to recommend it to the White House. What else does Iran want?”

 Beheshti outlined a number of issues that would have been difficult subjects for a U.S. diplomat to discuss without the usual rhetoric. In talking with me, however, the real interests beneath the positions came out.

BEHESHTI: “Sanctions must be ended.”

ROGER: “Ouch. Give me some good arguments that I can use with the U.S. government to recommend ending sanc­tions.”

BEHESHTI: “First, we have been punished enough.”

ROGER: “Well. President Carter could say that, but there is no clear standard for how much punishment would be ‘enough’ in this case. I will need more arguments.”

    BEHESHTI: “Well, to continue sanctions risks destabilizing the whole area.”

 

    ROGER: “Please explain that point. Why is that so?” 

    BEHESHTI: “Don’t you understand? Doesn’t your government understand?”

    ROGER: “I don’t know what the United States understands, but I don’t understand. Why do            sanctions risk destabiliz­ing the region?”

    BEHESHTI: “To import or export items contrary to the sanc­tions, officials on one or both sides     of the border have to be bribed. And the longer bribery of officials goes on, the more we and our     neighboring governments lose control over the boundary areas.”    

    ROGER: “That’s a good argument. Give me one more.”

    BEHESHTI: “Let me think. Oh, if the United States fails to end sanctions when the hostages are     released, it will never have a better excuse for doing so.”

    ROGER: “I like that point. I will certainly use it with the White House.”