The Crucible of Discourse: Embracing Conflict and Debate in the Pursuit of Truth

 Opinion, even fact itself, can

best be judged by conflict, by debate.  

There is an important element missing when there is

unanimity of viewpoint.

Diplomatic Maneuver

"In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.” - Lao Tzu

In Military Literature it is usual to characterize four stages for wartime. The first stage is the peaceful period; the second is escalation; the third is armed conflict; and the fourth is the day after war.

Compassion - The Antidote to War

"It is easy to love your friend, but sometimes the hardest lesson to learn is to love your enemy.”

- Lao Tzu

 

Justice Quote - Lao Tzu

 

"Wheels of Justice, grind slow but Grind fine"

 - Lao Tzu

Lessons from Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev - Accepting the offer

 Lessons:

1. 1. Clarity and Directness:

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   • Reference: "The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements."
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   • Lesson: Kennedy's clear and direct language leaves no ambiguity about the desired outcome and the specific actions required to achieve it.
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2. 2. Acknowledgment of Positive Steps:

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   • Reference: "I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem."
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   • Lesson: By acknowledging the Soviet Union's expressed desire for a prompt solution, Kennedy sets a constructive tone for further negotiations.

3. 
   

4. 
   

5. 3. Reciprocal Commitments:

   • 
     
   • Reference: "As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals - which seem generally acceptable as I understand them — are as follows..."
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   • Lesson: Kennedy acknowledges elements of the Soviet Union's proposals that are acceptable while clearly outlining reciprocal commitments expected from both sides.

6. 
   

7. 4. Importance of International Cooperation:

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   • Reference: "...for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements."
   • 
     
   • Lesson: Kennedy emphasizes the importance of involving the United Nations and international observers to oversee the implementation and verification of agreements.

8. 
   

9. 5. Focus on De-escalation:

10. • 
      
    • Reference: "The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis..."
    • 
      
    • Lesson: Kennedy warns against prolonging the crisis and stresses the urgency of resolving the Cuban issue promptly to prevent further escalation and risks to world peace.
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11. 6. Openness to Dialogue:

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    • Reference: "...we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals."
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    • Lesson: Kennedy expresses openness to further discussions and proposals beyond the immediate crisis, demonstrating a willingness to explore broader avenues for dialogue and cooperation.
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12. 7. Firmness with Diplomacy:

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    • Reference: "...the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees."
    • 
      
    • Lesson: While expressing a desire for peaceful resolution, Kennedy maintains firmness in his position regarding the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, emphasizing it as a crucial requirement for resolving the crisis.

13. 
    

Kennedy's letter to Krushchev accepting his offer

 Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements. Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend — in co-operation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative — an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals - which seem generally acceptable as I understand them — are as follows: 1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and under-take, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. 2. We, on our part, would agree — upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -— (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (6) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding ‘other armaments’, as proposed in your second letter, which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals. But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason, I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th. 

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Aeschylus

Even in our sleep, 

pain which cannot forget 

falls drop by drop upon the heart, 

until, in our own despair, 

against our will, 

comes wisdom through the awful 

grace of God.